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meaning could be modified depending on the authors’ 
actual goal. This situation is, of course, unsatisfactory 
and ultimately unacceptable. The purpose of this paper 
is thus to clarify the reasons for which, in our opinion, 
there is a frequent substantial loss of the meaning – and 
the value – of phenomenology as it is misinterpreted in 
sport related research.
We would like to sketch a brief critical overview 
of a number of representatively chosen, mostly sport-
research related texts which have the ambition to call 
themselves “phenomenological”. We shall demonstrate 
how the misunderstanding of some of the key distinc-
tions introduced by phenomenological philosophy 
often brings the authors to even epistemologically 
inconsistent assertions. These may be interesting from 
some points of view, but can in no way obtain objec-
tive scientific validity in the way the authors wish, i.e. 
simply by being labeled phenomenology. 
As the phenomenology is a discipline stemming 
from a particular historical context, its fundamental 
meaning is clearly defined in contrast to certain episte-
mological and ontological positions. Phenomenology 
fights especially against two ultimately inconsequent 
ways of thinking – first, skepticism and psychologism; 
and second, naive objective realism. The key problem 
with the majority of sport-research appropriations of 
Introduction
In the Euro-American cultural space, the term “phe-
nomenology” refers undoubtedly to a well-known phi-
losophical discipline founded by Edmund Husserl in 
the beginning the 20th century. This method of thinking 
was defined by its unique historical development that 
gave birth to a particular set of systematic questions, 
and was progressively developed by a series of founda-
tional authors, their pupils, successors and commenta-
tors. Simply put, from the perspective of the present-
day researcher, there is a tradition of phenomenology.
In the domain of sport research, however, the 
meaning of the discipline practiced as “phenomeno-
logy” frequently seems to lose any connection with 
this historically formed unit, or with this tradition, 
even though the authors expressly refer their texts to 
it. They allow themselves a great deal of freedom in 
applying phenomenology-related concepts (such as 
phenomenon, epochē, essence or structure, subjectivity, 
lived experience, world) and it seems almost as if their 
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phenomenology consists precisely in that there is a 
mismatch being made concerning the exact meaning 
of the distinctions introduced by phenomenology. 
Thus without any doubt, the authors introduce all 
the major phenomenological terms, but they do not 
securely grasp and clearly explain in contrast to what 
these have to be understood. Seemingly the same con-
cepts are used, but they acquire an entirely different 
meaning, as they stand in opposition to something else 
than they did originally. In other words, if the authors 
are unable to keep their thinking within the limits that 
define phenomenology in contrast to other intellectual 
stances, we can only say that there may be an inter-
esting discipline struggling for approval, but it is not 
phenomenology. Moreover, if this is the case, it cannot 
misappropriate phenomenological epistemological and 
ontological achievements, such as its status of a theory 
and its generally valid epistemological value.
Our argumentation has three steps: first, we explain 
that phenomenology is not a preference for the imme-
diate; second, we explain why phenomenology is not 
a predilection for personal perspective (an empirical 
subjectivism); third, we explain that phenomenology 
does not fundamentally deal with objects, that it is not 
a collection of empirical facts (qualitative research).
1. Phenomenology is not immediacy
Let us begin with a brief explanation of how phenome-
nology understands itself in contrast to other ways of 
theoretical thinking. The best way to do this will be to 
explain the meaning of the two Greek words “pheno-
menology” consists of phainomenon and logos.
The phainomenon of phenomenology is not any 
appearance – it is the uncovering of “the thing itself”. 
There is a phenomenological phenomenon when the 
reality starts to “speak for itself”, when the thing shows 
itself as what it is. This is the meaning of Edmund 
Husserl’s fundamental phenomenological slogan “to 
the things themselves!” (Husserl, 2001, p. 168). Not 
all “phenomena”, however interesting they may be, 
are thus phenomenological phenomena – a personal 
impression or even a sensory illusion indeed is a revela-
tion of “something”, i.e. it has a meaning, but it is not 
the phenomenon phenomenology speaks about, quite 
simply because it does not reveal “the thing itself”. 
Thus, if we observe “ice can look like glass” and assert 
that we are practicing phenomenology (Nilges, 2004), 
we are profoundly mistaken. The same goes for all 
cognitive “preconceptions”, “idealizations”, theoretical 
“schematizations” and other “idols” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1996) that obstruct our view of how things truly and 
concretely are. Moreover, as Heidegger explains in the 
initial paragraphs of Being and time (Heidegger, 2008a, 
especially §  7), all “mere phenomena” disconnected 
from the thing itself suppose the disclosure of some-
thing real, a real disclosure, a phenomenon in the 
full sense of the word. In other words, according to 
phenomenology, all subjective, perspectively deformed 
“phenomena”, delusions or abstractions of any type, 
presuppose the phenomenon of phenomenology, not 
the other way around.
There is thus a very high epistemological ambition 
in phenomenology, which fights first of all the skepti-
cal position inspired by Kantianism, for which “phe-
nomena” are not epistemologically valid, as they have 
no observable relationship with reality (“noumena”; cf. 
Kant, Critique of pure reason, trans. 1929, A40/B49). 
However, the sport-related research discussed in this 
paper seems to be completely unaware of these epis-
temological discussions; most of the time, the authors 
hold pre-phenomenological or even pre-Kantian episte-
mological stances, as we shall see.
The word logos in “phenomenology” implies, of 
course, that the discipline possesses necessarily the 
character of a discourse. In other words, being an 
interest in “the things themselves”, phenomenology 
is impossible without words and concepts. It is not a 
practice of sensation, perception or intuition; it is not 
a simple coincidence with the stream of consciousness, 
whether its objects would be “external” (perception) or 
“internal” (introspection). Phenomenology has thus 
twofold direction and dynamics: retrospective and 
reflexive on the one hand (back to the things them-
selves, phainomenon), and prospective and construc-
tive on the other (say what has not yet been said, logos). 
The conjunction of the two tendencies is paradoxi-
cal only on the first and superficial sight. The paradox 
of an “immediate account” of experience has been 
criticized by phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty notably 
regarding the philosophy of Henri Bergson (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968, chapter “Interrogation and Intuition”, 
in particular pp. 122–125). This author, claiming the 
necessity of blending with the durée through an imme-
diate intuition (cf. Bergson, 1919, 1992), was a Nobel 
Prize holder in literature who astounded his audience 
with exceptional rhetorical skills. Indeed, to be able to 
make our intelligence blend with the immediate as bril-
liantly as Henri Bergson did, we need to master at least 
the principal medium of human communication, the 
language. Thus, in order to be able to proclaim itself 
a philosophy, phenomenology requires a specific con-
ceptual work and effort. However it may seem paradoxi-
cal in relation to the appeal to get back to “the things 
themselves”, phenomenology is a creative intellectual 
discipline, the effort of clarification of meaning, and 
thus necessarily an activity of expression and an active 
conceptual construction – an ingenious use of language 
(logos) (cf. Heidegger, 2008a, pp. 28–30).
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How should we understand, then, such a statement 
as that “perhaps a phenomenological analysis of sport 
should turn directly to the immediacy of our experi-
ence in sport” (McLaughlin & Torres, 2012, p. 88)? 
Phenomenology does not deal with what is self-evident 
and obvious, even if it were from a somehow advanta-
geous standpoint (e.g. the sport-person’s). Heidegger 
(2008a, p. 31) thinks about our problem precisely in 
this way: “What is it that by its very essence becomes 
the necessary theme when we indicate something 
explicitly? Manifestly it is something that does not show 
itself initially and for the most part, something that is 
concealed, in contrast to what initially and for the most 
part does show itself.” A mere spontaneous verbal rec-
ollecting of “phenomena” in the sense the word has 
in common English, i.e. as observed existing facts or 
situations, a letting go to the naive realism of a particu-
lar person, does not itself make us phenomenologists. 
The uncovering of the thing itself does not happen by 
means of preferring “immediacy”, nor does it happen 
“spontaneously”, nor is it an “immersion” in the lived 
experience, a mere “self-disclosure”. “No holds barred” 
description, an ungrounded attempt to return to some 
mysterious coincidence with the real, does not guaran-
tee, in any way, the phenomenological quality of the 
result.
Philosophically, the unspoken meaning of an imme-
diate (sport) experience cannot be reached by holding 
one’s tongue and stopping to think – or just telling 
whatever is on our mind, which has the same effect. 
For it can only be restored by thinking and saying better 
than what is being said by all the constructs and sche-
matizations with only a weak connection to “the thing 
itself”. Yet how do we guarantee this “better” quality, 
thanks to which we pass from a personal impression to 
an investigation having general theoretical validity? If 
we ask the sportsman himself to speak, the meaning of 
his words won’t be “phenomenological” just because of 
his allegedly closer relationship to the matter itself. If 
his exposition really is phenomenological, it is because 
he is himself able to make the experience itself speak, 
rather than letting speak the explanations that are 
familiar to us, including the sportsman himself. In such 
a case, however, he is himself a philosopher master-
ing the expressive possibilities of the language, so his 
phenomenological quality does not itself stem from the 
fact that he is equally a sportsman. In all other cases, 
it still belongs to philosophers to look upon the (sport) 
activity of other people and to attempt to make it speak 
about itself – in short, to practice phenomenology.
So how do we acquire a “direct account of an expe-
rience” (Nesti, 2012, p. 105) according to phenomeno-
logy? Epistemological immediacy requires effort, 
not a bigger degree of spontaneity or automatism. 
Phenomenology is the dissatisfaction with the self-
evident, with our spontaneous and effortless precon-
ceptions. This is exactly the reason why Husserl speaks 
of the necessity of a phenomenological reduction: in 
a broader sense, the reduction is the transfer of the 
“still mute experience [...] to the pure expression 
of its proper meaning” (Husserl, 1988, p. 38, trans. 
modified; frequently cited by Merleau-Ponty, e.g. 
1958, pp. 254–255). The phenomenological analysis 
of experience is thus an active operation supposing an 
effort to get back closer to the nucleus of meaning of 
the thing itself, howsoever this nucleus is understood 
(for example as eidos or essence by Husserl, as Being 
of the beings by Heidegger, as structure by Merleau-
Ponty, as world for Patočka). In phenomenology, one 
strives to pass precisely from the singular, self-evident 
view to a more generally valid meaning, independent of 
our particular situation. Phenomenology is a struggle 
to overcome the original human situation, in which 
the explanations are more familiar than what is being 
explained, when we are losing connection between the 
meaning of the things for us and the meaning of the 
things themselves. Phenomenology is the “re-duction” 
or transfer of the intellectual attention from this sin-
gular, peculiar experience and the edifice of constructa 
it embraces towards the ground from which they rose 
and from which they still draw their ultimate meaning 
and intelligibility. (For a positive description of the 
phenomenological reduction in sport-literature, cf. e.g. 
Kerry & Armour, 2000).
In short, as the criterion of immediacy can hardly 
be held for a sufficient condition of theoretical faithful-
ness to reality, there is nothing inherently phenomeno-
logical about the sole decision to give an “immediate 
account” of experience. The idea of such an “immedi-
ate account” gets easily paradoxical if we understand 
it too simply, for no account is immediate. Inversely, 
phenomenology is nothing else than an interminable 
struggle to pass from this idea to its realization. As 
Merleau-Ponty put it: “The most important lesson 
which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of 
a complete reduction” (Merleau-Ponty, 1958, p. XV). 
The subsequent development of phenomenology and 
its actual state confirms this statement, even if Hus-
serl himself might not entirely accept it. In any case, 
and in accordance with the texts of all the phenom-
enologists discussed here, Husserl included, we have to 
assert that without an active and continuous effort of 
a purposeful clarification of meaning, we have no right 
to claim for ourselves the dimension of phenomeno-
logical logos. In other words, without such a constantly 
renewed conceptual work, there is nothing that could 
defend us from giving up to a mere epistemologi-
cally ungrounded phenomenalism – be it subjectively 
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skeptic (pseudo-Kantian relativism) or naively objectiv-
ist (western science included).
2. Phenomenology is not subjectivism
From our explanation to this point, it can be seen 
already how important it is to discuss the difference 
between phenomenology and “first-hand experience” 
(e.g. McLaughlin & Torres, 2012, p. 88), experience 
“in the first person”, “the subjective view of experi-
ence”, etc. Assuredly, Husserl’s phenomenology deals 
with subjectivity and its “mental processes” (Erlebnisse, 
cf. Husserl, 1982). But what does this mean exactly? 
“Subjective” experience as opposed to what? It is 
unquestionably not experience as opposed to the expe-
rience of other people, or experience of realities as they 
objectively are, as some sport-research related authors 
discussed below assert vehemently.
Husserl strives for a general (a priori) theory of 
knowledge, so for him, there is no interest in any of all 
the empirical relationships we can find in the world. 
For, at least in his opinion, the factual development 
of the content of our empirical, personal and singular 
consciousness cannot change the way in which the 
content or the object is “constituted” within the “tran-
scendental consciousness”. All subjective facts are still 
facts, empirical and particular, and are thus “set aside”, 
“bracketed”, insofar as they would pretend to represent 
any kind of phenomenological knowledge about how 
the reality shows itself to us. This epistemological 
position is what makes Husserlian phenomenology 
a transcendental philosophy, as opposed to empirical 
psychology or any introspective study of actual and 
particular stream of consciousness, or even more in 
general, as opposed to any empirical research (we shall 
return to this point later). The transcendental subjectiv-
ity Husserl speaks about is thus never a mere personal 
subjectiveness, but rather the very essence of what it 
means to “be a subject”, i.e. to experience something, 
to have a relationship with reality. The “transcendental 
ego” Husserl describes is not a concrete person, and the 
experience described on the level of the transcendental 
ego is not the experience of a particular person. 
Therefore, the “transcendental” structures are not 
“subjective” in the sense that they would represent a 
personal perspective, but quite on the contrary, they 
are entirely objective in the sense that they are necessary 
for any empirically subjective experience of real objects to 
take place. In short, they are the a priori conditions 
under which any type of object can only show itself as 
what it is. This is also the reason, why the interest in 
“phenomena”, which are “immanent” to the conscious-
ness, is equivalent for Husserl to the interest in “the 
things themselves” which are obviously transcendent. 
The description of this “correlation”, as Husserl calls it 
(e.g. 1970, § 46), between the independent reality and 
the way in which it is experienced by someone, is the 
principal task of phenomenology.
In this way, Husserl deals with the factual or even 
empirical events (objective as well as subjective) only 
to the extent that he can extricate from them an eidetic 
(essential) transcendental knowledge. In other words, 
he is not looking for facts, he is not primarily inter-
ested in describing some particular contents filling up 
our world (be it feelings or impressions of a particular 
subject), he is not collecting “empirical data”, verify-
ing hypotheses, doing experiments, asking specific 
people specific questions. For according to Husserl, a 
mere collection of facts does not make us understand 
how there is, and ever can be, a fact for us (cf. Husserl, 
1966, Lecture I.).
We believe that all the other important authors 
traditionally included in the phenomenological move-
ment further pursued this “transcendental” orientation 
of phenomenological philosophy, even if the term 
itself, linked to the Kantian conception of human 
experience as intellectual process taking place in the 
consciousness, was not used anymore. Thus, later on, 
phenomenology ceased to be the study of the tran-
scendental structures of the consciousness, as it was for 
Husserl, and became ontology (e.g. Heidegger, 2008a; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1968), an “asubjective”  description of 
the “world” for others (e.g. Patočka, 1998; cf. Bednář, 
2006; Martínková, 2006; Učník, 2007), or even a 
cosmology (e.g. Fink, 1960). However, in the sport 
research domain, the transcendental orientation of 
phenomenology, i.e. the fact it is an investigation of the 
conditions of experience, seems very often to be com-
pletely ignored. Let us thus shortly explain how some 
authors representative of the way phenomenology is 
misinterpreted in sport related research fail to under-
stand that Husserl’s “transcendental subjectivism” is 
not an epistemologically subjectivist position.
The goal of one of the texts by Gregory A. Dale, 
for example, is to promote “the subjective experience 
of the athlete as a viable resource of information” 
(Dale, 1996, p. 307), as opposed to the description 
of the event from the outside, with no personal par-
ticipation in the activity. This “first-person description 
of experience” (p. 309) focusing on “the participant’s 
experiences” (p. 310), i.e. a description of the “human 
life as it is lived and reflected upon in its first-person 
concreteness” (p. 309), is to be obtained by means of 
so-called “phenomenological interview” (p. 307). The 
purpose of this dialog between the researcher and the 
participant, who is considered to be an “expert on the 
phenomenon” (p. 313), is to “clarify the meaning” of 
the experience (p. 310) in order to obtain “qualitative 
data” (p. 315).
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It should be already evident in light of our introduc-
tory explications that the intellectual position described 
here does not coincide with phenomenology. Our brief 
summary demonstrates clearly enough that Dale’s 
(1996) idea of “phenomenological” research involves 
an empirical inspection of facts, where “phenomenon” 
has no particular phenomenological signification and 
refers only to empirically understood “qualitative” (i.e. 
meaningful) data or information; where subjective 
experience is understood as empirically subjective, i.e. 
as the experience of a concrete person; finally where to 
“clarify the meaning” means to say what it means to me, 
as a concrete, empirical person involved in the activity 
(cf. p. 310). (Exactly the same distortion: Nilges (2004, 
p. 299) and other authors discussed below; compare 
Hughson & Inglis (2012): “existential-phenomenolog-
ical reconstruction of play as experienced by a soccer 
player” (p. 2), a “definition of play, especially in terms 
of how it ‘feels’” (ibid.); McLaughlin & Torres (2011), 
rely on citations from McGinn (2008): “knowledge 
of what it feels like” (p. 68, italics added), description 
“from the inside” (p. 13, italics added); Kretchmar 
(2000), relies on an analytical description while inves-
tigating the meaning.) 
Such research cannot be criticized in itself and may 
have a kind of validity of its own. However, the notion 
of phenomenology is simply misused here in order to 
explain the difference in approach between two empiri-
cal methods that the author is unable to explain in a 
different way. Within such a phenomenalist (at the 
most) framework, the principal characteristic that 
makes this text unacceptable from the methodologi-
cal point of view is precisely its explicit reference to 
historically established phenomenology: we read about 
the “phenomenological reduction” as the “conscious-
ness of one’s presuppositions” (Dale, 1996, p. 311), 
about the “life-world” (p. 318) as the actual experience 
of a concrete person, about “bracketing” as a way of 
removing personal bias (p. 315), about “hermeneutic 
circle” (p. 315), etc. All these notions are adopted 
from Husserl’s and/or Heidegger’s philosophy, and 
they are fundamentally distorted in their meaning basi-
cally because the author mixes up the transcendental 
and the empirical approach to experience, the investi-
gation of eidetic structure with the search for factual 
occurrences (e.g. the opinion of a particular player). 
There is nothing inherently phenomenological in the 
sole use of personal experience, as even the most 
objective and/or positive sciences such as mathemat-
ics and physics would not exist without scientists qua 
persons and their personal experience; or as any per-
son suffering from hallucinations also have “personal 
experience”, in this case without any epistemological 
validity, i.e. the right to claim them to be experience 
of truth. The author uses phenomenology as a shield 
against the research based on quantification, because 
he is unable to formulate the difference of his approach 
in a positive manner. The fundamental fact is ignored 
that phenomenology does not fundamentally deal with 
a particular stream of a concrete experience of a par-
ticular person (phenomenalism), but with the essential 
structures of experience in general (phenomenology). 
Here as well as in other texts with similar flaws, 
the fundamental problem seems to be that the author 
does not even work with the original textual sources 
and feels sufficiently confident with his mistaken idea 
simply because there is a substantial body of literature 
already prone to this misleading use of the terms (cf. 
the list of Dale’s references, 1996, pp. 309–310). The 
meaning of the original phenomenological method 
remains practically undiscovered, the author builds his 
ideas on summaries of summaries of the original texts 
and imposes unacceptable generalizations, especially 
concerning Heidegger, whose fundamental ontology 
is labeled “a holistic psychology” or a “combination” 
of Husserl and Kierkegaard (p. 309). Unfortunately, 
almost the same type of misuse of phenomenological 
notions, flattened and emptied of its concrete contents, 
is presented in many other texts dealing with sport 
related topics. 
Walker (2007), for example, defines phenomeno-
logy correctly as a research approach striving to gain 
“insight into the essence or structure of the lived expe-
rience” (p. 36). Yet surprisingly, for her this means 
finally to produce a description “from the perspectives 
of those being studied” (p. 36), to recall “the partici-
pants’ perceptions of events” (p. 37) with the goal to 
“preserve the uniqueness of each participant’s lived 
experience” (p. 43). The author builds on a consider-
able amount of theoretical sources (e.g. Knaack, 1984; 
Polit & Hungler, 1999; Rose, Beeby, & Parker, 1995), 
but in the course of the concrete interpretation and 
application of the thought of phenomenology, she qui-
etly drops out the notion of “essence” or “structure”. 
In a similar manner, other authors presume that the 
essence means simply “what was it like” (Nilges, 2004, 
p. 300), “what it feels like” (McGinn, 2008, p. 68) for 
the particular person involved. This implies an unac-
ceptable reduction of phenomenology to a merely 
“personal” experience, to a “self-disclosure” or to an 
“immersion in the lived experience of others” (Walker, 
2007, p. 40) as opposed to the experience intersub-
jectively shared and demonstrated as truthful for 
everyone, as well as to essential structures phenomeno-
logy speaks about, which are valid in a general, trans-
personal and trans-temporal manner. Neither Walker 
nor the other authors demonstrate, in any way, how 
from one’s own personal experience we pass to the 
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aforementioned essence or structure of experience: the 
transition from “subjective” experience to the essence 
of experience is left entirely ungrounded. Simply put, 
we do not know how the authors want to guarantee 
that we do not deal with only a particular, inessential, 
incidental assortment of experiences. Yet this is, in our 
opinion, both a serious methodological flaw and the 
main reason for which phenomenology is reduced here 
to a plain subjectivism or phenomenalism dealing with 
merely subjective experiences, as opposed to the condi-
tions related to the subject which are necessary for the 
experience in general (transcendental subjectivity). 
All the phenomenological notions subsequently 
employed by the authors thus acquire a totally differ-
ent meaning than they had for Husserl and other phe-
nomenologists, and serve henceforth as instances of 
its subjectivist misinterpretation: “life-world” (Walker, 
2007, p. 40), “phenomenon” (p. 42), the experience 
“as lived” (p. 37), “bracketing” (p. 42), “epochē” (Stoll, 
1982, p. 13), understanding (Stewart, 2006). As we 
can see in Nilges’ (2004) case, this can lead to a rather 
tragicomic confusion, when the general orientation of 
the consciousness towards objects (“intentionality”) 
becomes simply dependence of the meaning on one’s 
personal intention: intentionality as a “personal mean-
ing” (p. 312), “highly individualized” view (p. 299), 
etc. 
These basic misunderstandings of the idea of 
phenomenology, let us say it again, show a complete 
lack of knowledge of the original texts, in particular 
those by Husserl, who explicitly addresses precisely the 
same topics and fundamental distinctions, especially 
between the transcendental and the empirical subject. 
The authors just confuse what lies at the very founda-
tion of the idea of phenomenology, the difference 
between the essential structure of experience, or the 
transcendental characteristics of the subjectivity, and 
a concrete, particular subject with his/her “opinion” or 
“feeling”. The inability to respect this differentiation 
makes these authors’ claims epistemologically implau-
sible, or at least methodologically ungrounded, as far 
as they expect such a foundation from phenomeno-
logy. The transition from the empirically subjective 
experience to the transcendentally subjective structure 
is methodologically very well grounded in Husserl’s 
phenomenology by the “phenomenological reduc-
tion” (sometimes further differentiated in transcen-
dental and eidetic reduction). For example the “pure” 
phenomenon of time is, for Husserl, the inextricable 
linkage between the “still here” character of the recent 
past, the intensity of present perception, and the pres-
sure of imminent events – it is neither the objectively 
measured time of a runner (how many seconds?) nor 
the runners’ inner feeling (does time “run fast”, am I 
bored?). (Cf. Husserl, 1964, as opposed e.g. to Aris-
totle on time, Physics, trans. 2008; Metaphysics, trans. 
2004; for a sound phenomenological discussion of 
the topic of time in sport literature, see Bednář, 2003; 
Hogenová, 2006; Jirásek, 2007; or Martínková, 2007.) 
As the phenomenon is not a “feeling”, it does not 
occur simply “by itself”, and it requires a very specific 
intellectual attitude and effort, thanks to which we get 
through a process of imaginary and descriptive varia-
tion in order to uncover an invariant and pass from 
the factual experience here and now to the eidos, or 
the essence, of this experience. We ask, for example, 
which structural features have to be present in order 
to permit the existence of a “time object”, and we find 
that any time object has to hold together and link in an 
orderly manner the phases of “not any more”, “right 
now” and “not yet”. We intellectually and descriptively 
search for the limits beyond which the phenomenon 
described loses its meaning and ceases to be what it is 
for us. We are not discussing the relationships between 
particular objects in time, for example, because such 
discussions precisely presuppose the phases of the time 
object already linked together, and are subordinated to 
the generally valid structure described as the “pure” 
phenomenon of time.
Thus the experience “as lived” (e.g. Osterhoudt, 
1974, p. 139; Walker, 2007, p. 37) does not by itself 
mean a phenomenologically understood experience. 
Likewise, Husserl never stresses that what, in the sub-
jective experience he studies, is opposed to the experi-
ence of other subjects (as Nilges and others do). He 
stresses that which, in the subjective or intersubjective 
experience, is leibhaftig, i.e. given with an original evi-
dence, as opposed to that which does not pertain to the 
particular phenomenon studied, and is given only as 
an assumption. This is simultaneously why, finally, all 
scientific hypotheses are also excluded, why the results 
of empirical research are understood as irrelevant, and 
why we talk about the world “as lived”. The “facts” 
coming to us from the world, and thus also all the 
scientific observations using them as their necessary 
foundation, need the constituted world and the objects 
filled with meaning – they only build on the ground 
of the “constitution” of the experience itself, which is 
precisely described by phenomenology, and thus can-
not bring anything radically new that would change it.
Thus, far from applying a predilection for a merely 
subjective experience, Husserl is looking for that which 
is common to all subjectivities in general. We can see 
that authors criticized in this section of our text simply 
fail to identify in contrast to what Husserl is using the 
expressions such as “subjective” or “as lived” – such 
an experience is understood in phenomenology as 
opposed to the experience of relationships between 
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the constituted objects (relations also studied by all 
empirical sciences), whereas the sport-research related 
scholars mentioned above proceed as if it meant the 
experience as opposed to what others may live, a per-
sonal experience.
3. Phenomenology is not empirical research
Just as phenomenology is interested in “mental pro-
cesses”, it is also interested in realities transcending 
human consciousness. The word “phenomenon”, says 
Husserl, is essentially ambiguous, referring both to the 
subjectivity-related ways of appearing and to the object 
that appears (e.g. 1966). But again, in what sense does 
phenomenology deal with realities, with what we can 
observe as given in the world? Again, it is only to the 
extent that it can use these facts as the ground for the 
explication of what it means to be an object, a segment 
of reality, in order for us to have experience of it. This 
differentiation can be seen accurately in the examples 
of the analyzes of the play by Huizinga (1955) and Fink 
(1960, 1968), who respectively adopt more empirically 
and meaning-oriented analysis of the phenomenon. 
The importance of the phenomenological “epochē” 
as the abandonment of our preconceptions lies exactly 
in the resolution not to transfer the “real”, empirical 
and factual, relationships “object–object” to the tran-
scendental relationship “subject–object”, for we can 
only study the relationships between objects in the 
world thanks to the transcendental relationship, not the 
other way around. In other words, the experience and 
the subjectivity cannot themselves be held for objects, 
for it is only thanks to them that we have objects; and, 
if this is the case, our factual knowledge about objects 
has nothing to tell us about the very possibility that we 
can, in general, have relationships with objects. 
This does not mean, however, that facts are simply 
irrelevant for phenomenology. It is well known, for 
example, that the method Husserl used to describe the 
transcendental structures was by following a system of 
“transcendental clues” (cf. e.g. the title of §21 in Hus-
serl, 1988). This means that he described the eidetic 
transcendental structures on factually or even empiri-
cally given objects, and nowhere else. When describing 
the “pure” phenomenon of time, or the essence of 
time object, Husserl used the example of a resonating 
tone. Phenomenological “intuition of essences” would 
be impossible without a fundamental contact with the 
“real” (i.e. not merely subjective) world which is the 
world of given objects: the essence or the meaning is 
precisely explicated by means of an “eidetic variation” 
performed on a factually given object, be it an ideal or an 
empirical one. The importance of the study of facticity 
is not stressed very much by Husserl himself, especially 
in his first period, but acquires much more importance 
in his later thinking (which becomes the study of the 
Lebenswelt, the world “as lived”) and in the subsequent 
development of phenomenology. It is well known, for 
example, how Heidegger succeeded in explaining the 
importance of the mortal character of our existence 
(facticity) or the fact that we are prone to have differ-
ent “moods”. These facts related to human existence 
did not seem to be essential for Husserl, but Heidegger 
was able to show their transcendental value, their fun-
damental role in the constitution of experience. In a 
similar manner, for example Merleau-Ponty has shown 
the fundamental role played in our experience by our 
body which is the archetype of all human facticity: as a 
body, we were born and will die one day, we have sexual 
drives, various acquired habits, undergone pathologies, 
etc. The three authors we just mentioned, as well as 
for instance E. Fink or J. Patočka, worked phenomeno-
logically and each of them was able to include different 
factual observations in their research, and revealed the 
transcendental structure of human existence in a new, 
hopefully more complete way.
Thus, it has to be stressed very strongly that even 
if we are phenomenologically interested in facts or 
observable realities in the world, which can also 
include those revealed by science, this does not mean 
that the purpose of this interest is to collect such facts. 
The focus of phenomenology remains always on the 
meaning of the facts. As we can see especially on the 
example of Merleau-Ponty (1958, 1963), even if we 
discuss everything which is revealed by physiology or 
medical pathology, these facts are studied only to the 
extent to which it can be shown that they have some 
transcendental value. This is basically what differenti-
ates phenomenology from empirical science, even the 
“qualitative” type: dealing with the same realities, the 
approach to them is absolutely different. If the episte-
mological goal of phenomenology is not to collect facts 
but describe how there are facts for us, the concrete 
objects on which these structures are demonstrated 
do not play any fundamental role and have no special 
importance (in the same way as it has no importance 
whose empirically “subjective” mental processes are 
studied). The transcendental structures are transcen-
dental precisely if the facts cannot overturn them, i.e. 
if it is only through them that there are any facts for us. 
Therefore working with facts in phenomenology 
brings a big challenge: the purpose of such research 
cannot be merely to collect the facts (which is always 
done on the basis of an essential structure, or mean-
ing which is familiar to us already), but instead, the 
phenomenologist has to show the essential value of 
the fact studied, for otherwise we would fall outside 
of the regime of phenomenology. In other words, in 
phenomenology we are not interested in facts or particular 
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cases if we cannot show that they are essential in regard to 
our experience as such.
Unfortunately, the sport research related “pheno-
menology” is very often unable to reach such level of 
philosophical quality. Here, “phenomenon” can only 
mean a particular reality in the world, with no eidetically 
transcendental pertinence at all. There is for instance 
the definition of its particular objective characteristics, 
its differentiation from other events,  entirely object-
directed analysis from the bio-mechanical perspective; 
there are examples of analyses that discuss the con-
tinuum tourism-pilgrimage (Cohen, 1979), styles and 
elements of snowboarding (Loland, 2007), character-
istics of festivity (Eichberg, 2009a), the connection of 
song and movement (Eichberg, 2009b), some others 
that look for connections between sport and laughter 
(Eichberg, 2009c). All these descriptions of “phenom-
ena” are labeled as phenomenology, but the authors do 
not strive at all for a description from the point of view 
of the essence of our experience.
The challenge opened by the phenomenological 
approach to facts opens also the big question whether 
a mere application of a phenomenologically described 
essential structure of experience can have the right to 
call itself a “phenomenology”. There are some “correct 
applications”, in which phenomenologically described 
transcendental structures are applied to a specific sport-
related context (cf. for example Arnold, 1983; Harper, 
1969; Hogenová, 2009; Hogeveen, 2012; Hughson 
& Inglis, 2002; Kretchmar, 1974; Meier, 1975; Mar-
tínková, 2012; Papadimitriou, 2008; Standal & Moe, 
2012; Vannatta, 2008). There is, however, also another 
type of texts, where the borderline between phenom-
enological and empirical research remain unclear and 
where the authors do not seem to understand clearly 
what the essence of a phenomenological investigation 
is. It is on these texts that we would like to focus in the 
following paragraphs.
One of the main and the most frequently cited 
sources of Dale’s (1996) text is Fahlberg, Fahlberg, 
and Gates (1992); both of them also share their 
main source – Polkinghorne (1989). In Fahlberg’s et 
al. case, there seems to be a considerable shift in the 
right direction. Although the authors never mention 
or distinguish between empirical and transcenden-
tal research, they seem to recognize, at least on the 
theoretical level, that a phenomenological investigation 
“emphasizes the essential structure of consciousness 
through which experience is organized and made 
meaningful” (p. 181). However, even if the authors also 
stress the importance of the meaning (e.g. p. 184), they 
again speak of “data collection” and “data analysis” 
(p. 184), and the principal method for them is, again, 
an interview with a concrete participant. In this way, 
it becomes unclear what exactly are the authors look-
ing for: looking for “data”, will they automatically find 
any structurally essential “meaning”? In our opinion, 
a “datum” is precisely a concrete occurrence of a pre-
given meaning, specified beforehand by the research 
question or the working hypothesis, so the orientation 
of the research seems inverted if we compare it with the 
phenomenological method.
This methodological shift, which is, in our opinion, 
a shift from phenomenology to empirical research, 
is indeed clearly visible in the authors’ conclusion. 
Although they claim that phenomenology reveals 
“essential structures” of human experience, their work 
seems to be only empirical application to a particular 
case of an essential structure revealed and described 
not by them, but by Heidegger (2008a). In other words, 
the authors formulated their research question with the 
help of a meaning developed by phenomenology, but 
this question is itself related to an empirical, not phe-
nomenological, research. Their argumentation can be 
summed up as follows: humans are beings that under-
stand themselves as a whole, i.e. there is a meaning in 
every particular activity humans do; the same activity 
(e.g. exercise) can thus have different meaning in dif-
ferent cases (research hypothesis); this applies even to 
dependencies, therefore even exercise dependency has 
a meaning (fact observed). Far from applying a phe-
nomenological method (which the authors, in fact, pres-
ent only very briefly), the only characteristic connect-
ing the text to phenomenology is that it makes use of a 
particular topic treated by one of the phenomenological 
authors, Heidegger. Furthermore, the authors merely 
(re)discover that humans are not exclusively material 
objects, i.e. that their behavior is properly intelligible 
only with regard to the meaning it has for them. This 
simple fact does not seem strong enough to differentiate 
this “phenomenology” from empirical investigation, in 
particular from the social sciences in general. So again, 
the research may not need to be criticized with regard 
to its concrete contents, but the authors fail to dem-
onstrate what is inherently “phenomenological” about 
it – their methodological reference to phenomenology 
does not have any reasonable foundation, as they only 
apply empirically a particular content borrowed from 
phenomenology. 
In conclusion, the authors seem to have studied the 
original phenomenological texts and they cite them 
correctly, but their concrete work cannot, in any case, 
be taken for phenomenological, as they investigate only 
a factual applicability (or inapplicability) of a particu-
lar type of phenomenologically revealed general struc-
ture. The question of factual existence or nonexistence 
of a “phenomenon” (the presence of a meaning in a 
particular case of exercise dependency) is in no way 
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a phenomenological question, but clearly an empirical 
one, and the two questions stem from a totally different 
epistemological attitudes.
With the example of Breivik’s work on skydiving 
(2010), we can show in even more depth how challeng-
ing is every attempt to produce a phenomenology of 
sport activity. Breivik basically tries to uncover an essen-
tial trait of human existence on the basis of an analysis 
of a particular type of human activity, skydiving. Such 
an attempt to describe a fundamental, transcendentally 
eidetic value of a particular, concrete activity deserves 
in itself our appreciation, especially as it is also based 
on a thorough study of the original source of inspira-
tion, Heidegger’s Being and time (2008a). Concretely, 
the author strives to show that the first act of skydiv-
ing opens up the “original situation” of being “thrown 
in the world” (p. 30); more precisely, when falling 
through the air, “there is no longer a world” (p. 32), 
because the “equipmentality breaks down” (p. 32) and 
so “the being in the world has become a being in the 
void” (p. 33); this, in turn, would make it possible to 
confront ourselves actively with the possibility of our 
death, which means finally that it would make our life 
“authentic” (as understood principally by Heidegger).
Without getting into the details of Breivik’s argu-
mentation, let us show briefly how, here again unfortu-
nately, the author fails to differentiate the factual struc-
ture from the transcendentally essential one, and how 
for this reason he fails to provide a phenomenological 
account of the sport activity concerned.
First, the “world” is, for Heidegger (2008a), a fun-
damental structural moment of Dasein: “the worldli-
ness of the world […] is an existential determination of 
being-in-the-world, that is, of Da-sein”; “the world […] 
was characterized as a structural factor of being-in-the-
world”, that is, of Dasein (p. 82 and p. 94). So the idea 
brought out by Breivik (2010), that the original way 
of living of Dasein and the starting point of authentic 
existence is “solus ipse, a worldless self”, “worldless 
subject” (p. 40 and p. 48), goes straight against the 
core of Heidegger’s analysis of human existence. How 
could we imagine Da-sein without the Da? The world 
as understood by Heidegger, i.e. as an existential (or as 
Husserl would say – eidetic, transcendental) structural 
characteristic of Dasein, is not based in perceptible 
space, but inversely, “physical space” is founded in 
the world and the worldliness of Dasein. Heidegger’s 
goal is to show, for instance, “how the aroundness of 
the surrounding world, the specific spationality of 
the beings encountered in the surrounding world is 
grounded in the worldliness of the world, and not the 
other way around, that is, we cannot say that the world 
in its turn is objectively present in space.” (Heidegger, 
2008a, p. 94, italics added). Furthermore, Heidegger 
explains clearly that Dasein is originally Mitsein, being 
together with others, and not, in any way, an isolated 
being, solus. Thus, even when being factually unable to 
perceive the presence of physical space, or when being 
factually isolated from the others, we do not encounter 
a “disintegration” or “disappearance” of the world, as 
Breivik suggests (p. 29 and p. 30). In other words, the 
“existential”, generally valid structure of our existence, 
named “world” by Heidegger, is in no way affected by 
any circumstantial absence! In short, it is not a factual 
structure which could be present or absent, it is the 
transcendental structure which is the condition of pos-
sibility for every factual absence or presence.
Our conclusion is confirmed more concretely if 
we penetrate deeper into Breivik’s (2010) explana-
tion of the example of skydiving. The author spends 
a considerable amount of energy to persuade us that 
when in a free fall, there is no world structure for us – 
the world allegedly “falls apart”, “disappears” (p. 29). 
However, the author did not succeed in explaining why 
he interprets the absence of some concrete contents 
of experience as an absence of the world (understood 
as the transcendental structure of existence). In our 
opinion, it is evident that this understanding of Hei-
degger’s analysis is mistaken not only formally, but 
even in terms of simple descriptive fidelity. Breivik’s 
assertion that in the case of the free fall, “the context as 
such is missing […] there is no world, but only a void” 
(p. 34) is grounded on too narrow an understanding of 
the “context” and thus on a misunderstanding of the 
concept of world. 
Worldliness cannot be reduced to “all the function-
ing equipmental totalities and contexts” (p. 32; cf. 
Breivik, 2007). As the skydiver jumps from somewhere 
(plane) to somewhere (ground), from some altitude to 
point zero of altitude, the jump and the fall are never 
a step outside of all context, i.e. the context as a struc-
ture of our experience is never completely missing. 
But the authors’ description, which is more expressive 
than accurate, overlooks this context and leads us into 
confusion.
This structure from–to, up–down may be lived very 
intensely as somehow problematic, confused or sus-
pended, but it is never absent, as every skydiver acts on 
its ground and understands in all circumstances that 
he/she is precisely falling, down, from above. We may 
not be sure at the moment where the up and the down 
is, but we know all the time that there is an up and a 
down, the ground and the sky, and that we have to act 
accordingly. The world is not only the prosaic equip-
mentality of the carpenters’ workshop Breivik speaks 
about, but also the big dimensions such as the resistant 
ground and the open space of the sky. This is clearly 
visible on Heidegger’s own subsequent development 
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and his evidently wider understanding of worldliness 
of the world not merely as equipmentality (cf. Hei-
degger, 2008b). The oriented character of the free fall 
that enables us to perceive it meaningfully as a threat 
to our life is precisely the structure that Heidegger calls 
“world”. If the world were actually absent, the act of 
jumping would not be so emotionally challenging. It 
would not have any meaning at all.
In conclusion, here again, the author’s problematic 
application of the concept of world in the case of sky-
diving demonstrates clearly that he has not grasped the 
fundamental difference between a necessarily existing 
fundamental structure (the worldliness of Dasein) and 
a factual, empirical, circumstantial occurrence that 
may, or may not, exist (the absence of the “world” as a 
part of the complex of objects we can act upon, stand 
on, etc.). The author fails to understand the difference 
between a privative modality of the presence of the 
world (something is missing, for example the ground) 
and the absence of the world itself (the structural pos-
sibility of the presence or absence of a particular seg-
ment of reality). This confusion is also clearly visible 
in Breivik’s other assertions, such as that “to establish 
a world takes time” (2010, p. 34) or that it is a “long 
learning process” (p. 35). Breivik’s “world” is, at best, 
a factual structure that can be present or absent, that 
can arise or disappear – it is not a phenomenon as 
understood by phenomenology, i.e. a transcendentally 
essential structure of experience. We are thus outside 
of the regime of phenomenology.
As a matter of fact, Breivik’s text (2010) would ful-
fill almost perfectly the definition of basic-level empiri-
cal research, in which a well-known hypothesis is tested 
and confirmed in a new, particular context. However, 
the author presents his findings as if they somehow 
revealed an essential trait of human experience and life 
– he claims that by involving ourselves in high-risk situ-
ations, by “losing control” (p. 40) of our equipmental 
environment, we become “authentic” in the Heidegge-
rian sense, i.e. we gain access to the truth of our exis-
tence. However, as the connection between the authen-
ticity and risk-taking activity is grounded on a faulty 
interpretation of the concept of world, understood as 
a factual and therefore destructible structure, Breivik’s 
conclusion should not be accepted. Moreover, by using 
the expression “being-in-the-void” (with hyphens), the 
author mimics the Heideggerian way of describing 
the fundamental structures of existence, whereas he 
did not unveil any. (The same grief applies to at least 
one other author who uses an analogically misguided 
pseudo-Heideggerian expression “being-on-the-bench” 
– Ryall, 2008.) The only point that has been proven, in 
our opinion, is that Heidegger’s analysis of the worldli-
ness of Dasein is valid even in the particular case of 
“falling through empty air” (Breivik, 2010, p. 30). In 
other words, the fundamental structure of human exis-
tence described phenomenologically by Heidegger was 
proven precisely as fundamental, valid in general and 
independent even of this particular context, because 
the fact of standing on the ground or falling through 
the air did not force us to change anything about it. In 
short, Breivik confuses the factual void (“empty air”) 
with an ontological void (“world is missing”), whereas 
any factual absence is precisely possible only on the 
ground of the ontologically relevant presence of Das-
ein, i.e. of the fundamental structure being-in-the-world.
Finally, in the recent article by McLaughlin and 
Torres (2012), we can see how problematic it still is 
to see clearly the boundary between phenomenology 
and a simple empirical recollection of a (first-person) 
experience. The authors assert that “the determination 
of what is rational or meaningful in a given context can 
in some instances be specific and relevant only to that 
context. […] Therefore, doubt can be cast on the appli-
cability of phenomenological insights to sport that are 
derived from phenomenological analysis unrelated to 
or disconnected from sport” (McLaughlin & Torres, 
2012, pp. 88–89). This means for us that the authors 
either do not understand the eidetic character of phe-
nomenology, or they disapprove of it – in both cases, 
any further reference to phenomenology is prohibited, 
which is not in harmony with what the authors claim 
in the rest of their paper. If our insights are not at least 
presumptively eidetic, i.e. acceptable in general, we are 
not anymore on the ground of phenomenology – we 
are at the most on the ground of phenomenalism or 
naive realism, and the totality of our discussions deal 
only with “phenomena” in the ordinary sense, i.e. we 
talk about particular objects in the world as viewed by 
someone particular and we deal with these “data”. Our 
initial impression is confirmed by the authors’ claims 
about the “subjective” character of phenomenology 
(ibid., pp. 88–89; the authors use a quotation from 
McGinn, 2008, and Moran, 2000), understood here 
again as empirically subjective, not transcendentally. 
Yet McLaughlin and Torres still present their text as 
“phenomenological” and, adding to the general confu-
sion, they finally assert that the notions of horizon and 
intersubjectivity, as developed by phenomenologists 
and presented by the authors, “are actually constitutive 
elements of human experience in general” (McLaughlin 
& Torres, 2012, p. 89) – therefore eidetic transcenden-
tal characteristics, as we would say with Husserl. Thus, 
even if we consider the authors’ conclusions regarding 
horizon and intersubjectivity as quite authentically 
phenomenological, the notion of “phenomenology” 
seems to be very fuzzy for them: there is no clear expla-
nation of the relationship between the mere empirical 
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subjectiveness of “phenomena” and their proclaimed 
objective epistemological value. The authors’ philo-
sophical position in regard to phenomenology thus 
remains unclear and so it does for their reader.
Conclusion
We have to conclude finally that the inability to dis-
cern transcendental subjectivity from personal sub-
jectiveness entails a confusion of phenomenology 
with psychological subjectivism or phenomenalism, 
and the inability to discern transcendental structures 
from factual objective structures entails a confusion of 
phenomenology with empirical research (be it “quali-
tative”), i.e. with an epistemologically naive realism 
(be it that practiced by the western science). Even if 
some of the authors have the ambition to uncover some 
“essential structures” of experience, they still describe 
mostly empirically subjective or objective “phenomena” 
in the common sense of the word. Yet, as we tried to 
explain, the phenomena that phenomenology speaks 
about are not empirically subjective, nor empirically 
objective, they are the meaning of the thing without 
which there is no such thing – they represent the core 
of the meaning of a particular type, they are eidetic, 
essential or epistemologically fundamental structures 
of experience.
We very much doubt that the kind of arguable appli-
cation of the notion of phenomenology we describe 
here is due simply to a plain interpretative incompe-
tence. The authors link their work to the historically 
established discipline, naturally because they need an 
epistemological or even ontological foundation for their 
actual research – which they feel is, somehow, valid. 
And phenomenology seems to provide it, i.e. it offers 
a way in which a personal, singular view of the world 
can be studied and described with a general validity. 
(And this has to be a correct standpoint, because we 
have access to reality even as individuals.) Yet, since 
the authors did not accept the “phenomenological atti-
tude” and still conserve the “natural attitude” (Husserl, 
1982), which does not deal with phenomenological 
phenomena but with realities, their attempt to take 
over epistemological validity from phenomenology can 
never be successful.
However, as we have already noted, the relation-
ship between empirical and transcendental structures, 
at first understood by Husserl as a strict opposition, 
became more complex as phenomenology itself devel-
oped. For Merleau-Ponty, for example, the relationship 
between the facticity and transcendentality is that of 
a circular interdependency (see for example Merleau-
Ponty’s discussion with sociology – 1964). This opens, 
in our opinion, a space for a possible phenomenology 
of sport, which many authors called for a long time ago 
(Meier, 1984; Osterhoudt, 1974; Weiss, 1982). For this 
means that the phenomenology is not an out-worldly 
“intuition of essences” that would progress with no 
relation to the factual world, notably the world where 
humans do, or do not, practice sport. Since we still can 
get such an impression from some of the perhaps more 
narrowly Husserlian presentations of phenomenology 
(e.g. Martínková & Parry, 2012), we have tried to pres-
ent a somewhat broader image of phenomenology with 
respect to its post-Husserlian development, especially 
to its reflection by Merleau-Ponty. (The importance of 
this author for sport research has been already stressed, 
cf. Fielding, 1999; Hughson & Inglis, 2002; Meier, 
1975; Morris, 2003; Waldenfels, 2008.) The fact that 
humans practice sport can be studied phenomenologi-
cally, i.e. it can be explained in regard to its potential 
relevance for experience and the human condition in 
general. Unfortunately, as far as we know, such a faith-
fully phenomenological investigation of sport activity 
remains to be written, as the majority of acceptable 
“phenomenological” papers on sport remain primar-
ily correct applications of the essential structures 
disclosed by some of the classical phenomenologists 
without any consideration of sport.
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